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Morality, Culture Wars, & God's Existence

Submitted by Ken Watts on Thu, 03/29/2007 - 16:55

Francis Collins, the scientist who headed up the human genome project, was interviewed on Fresh Air today on the subject of faith and science. (PZ Myers, at Pharyngula, has a review of the entire interview.)

When asked what evidence he sees for the existence of God, he cited the "knowledge of right and wrong". To be fair, he acknowledged immediately that this did not prove God's existence. But others have felt it does.

The argument interests me for reasons that have nothing to do with the existence of God, one way or the other, and everything to do with several topics I have been writing about here for some time.

The gist of the argument is this: All humans (or at least the vast majority) recognize the existence fairness and unfairness, of moral distinctions, in short, of a moral law—a set of rules or principles which lay out the difference between right and wrong. We do this even though such rules are not always to our advantage, and sometimes actually work against our survival, thus undermining the idea of evolution. Since such moral laws exist, there must be a moral lawgiver—in a word, God.

Many things could be said about this chain of reasoning, but the point which interests me is that it entirely depends on the conflation of two types of morality, which I have described in detail elsewhere.

  • The "practical" or "wisdom" model, which views morality as consisting of the search for the best means to live out the values of empathy, reciprocity, peacemaking, etc. which we all naturally possess as humans.
  • The "authoritarian" or "legal" model, which views morality as a set of rules to be followed because they have objective authority (usually because God has commanded them).

The truth is that we all use both models. We can hardly avoid the wisdom model, because it is natural to humans. Empathy, reciprocity, and peacemaking are normal parts of our nature, because we have evolved as social animals. So, we naturally will develop ways to put them into practice, and all have first hand experience of this kind of morality.

The legal model is overlaid on this experience from an early age, as parents, teachers, etc. (authorities) tell us what is "right" and "wrong", often framing these commands in terms of the legal model. Since often these commands are in tune with our own, practical perceptions of right and wrong, the two models overlap, making them easy to conflate. And this very conflation gives credibility to the legal model when it is used to enforce commands which are not in tune with our natural moral sense.

My Sunday-school teacher tells me that God has declared all kinds of things are wrong: calling names, hitting, stealing lunch money, teasing, dancing, and playing cards. My own, practical, moral sense already senses the problem with the first four, and this gives credibility to her authority, so by the time she gets to dancing and cards, I've conflated my own instincts with her legalistic views.

The moral argument for the existence of God plays upon this conflation.

It appeals to our sense that there are real "oughts" in the world, and that these are naturally and obviously true—a sense that is rooted in the morality of the wisdom model. Then it identifies this sense with the legal model, and proceeds to point out that that model requires a final Authority: God.

Without the confusion between the two models it just doesn't work.

But as I said before, proof of God's existence, or the lack of it, is not my interest here. My interest is the pervasive results of this underlying conflation between the two models.

The cultural struggle our society is currently going through is largely fueled by this same confusion. For the two models perceive morality in quite different ways.

The wisdom model sees moral teaching as the passing on of rules of thumb.

It well knows that there can be no final moral code that covers every situation in advance, that morality, by its nature, is improvised from situation to situation. "Thou shalt not lie" cannot, and should not, apply to the Nazis at the door; "thou shalt not steal" does not apply to parents trying to feed their kids in a town flooded out by a hurricane.

The wisdom model knows that I, a straight man, have no business laying down rules for the sexual behavior of gays, or any right to judge anyone else's moral decisions.

The legal model not only says that there are specific, all-encompassing moral rules, but that I have the obligation to decide what they are, and to impose them on you.

Left to itself, the legal model would sink under the weight of its own absurdity. The first time you and I disagreed about the rules, and both claimed to have the right to impose our view on the other, it would become apparent that we were making up arbitrary rules.

But the confusion between the two models, combined with some people's beliefs that they have privileged information, creates a situation in which those people can believe they have the right—no, the responsibility—to force their views on others.

We can only hope that they never get the political power to do so.

At least, that's what I think today.