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Sam Harris's Argument for His "Is to Ought" Leap

Submitted by Ken Watts on Tue, 05/18/2010 - 12:00

I'VE ARGUED THAT Sam Harris's talk about a scientific morality at TED only manages to sound plausible because he conflates two different uses of the word "moral":

  1. A belief or act based in an idea of rightness or wrongness.

    We use this meaning when we refer to the moral beliefs of a religion or culture other than our own, or of a person who we may or may not agree with, as in "It was a moral issue for him."
  2. A belief or act based in a correct idea of rightness or wrongness.

    We use this meaning when we speak about our own sense of right and wrong—and when we speak about a universal morality.

Sam's case—that all morality can be reduced to scientific questions about the well being of conscious creatures—could be based on either of these uses of the word "moral".

But, in fact, he bases it on the first one:

And there is no notion, no version of human morality and human values that I've ever come across that is not at some point reducible to a concern about conscious experience and its possible changes.

Even if you get your values from religion, even if you think that good and evil ultimately relate to conditions after death -- either to an eternity of happiness with God or an eternity of suffering in hell -- you are still concerned about consciousness and its changes.

That is, he attempts to make the case that all human morality—and it's clear he's using the word in the first sense here—can be reduced to a concern about conscious suffering and happiness.

The problem with this approach is that it just doesn't seem to be true.

I've already provided two examples: religious positions again homosexuality, and people who feel a moral obligation to the dead.

In both cases, for different reasons, the "oughtness" is not a function of human well being.

His last sentence in the quote above betrays a deep misunderstanding of many Christians—especially fundamentalist Christians.

They do not see the rewards in heaven or punishments in hell as the basis of their morality, but only as the just reward or the just penalty for obeying or not obeying God.

Right and wrong, in their morality, is based on what God decides, period.

I don't know how extensive Sam's research behind the phrase "that I've ever come across" has been, but I would suspect that he includes cases where he can reduce the issue to the suffering and happiness of conscious creatures, given his own moral position, but the people involved would not agree.

Much of morality in the real world is focused on tradition—doing things the way they've always been done because that is perceived as upholding positive values.

Rarely, in those cases will you find the person defending tradition to make, or even consider, the idea that it all boils down to pain and pleasure.

So where does that leave Sam Harris?

  1. If he uses the word moral in the first sense—which he appears to be doing—his argument fails because it simply isn't true that all the moral systems in the world can be reduced to conscious happiness vs. conscious suffering.

    There are many people who simply believe that God's will, as interpreted by their tradition, trumps any idea of human well being, and that humanity has a moral obligation to follow God's will, even if it leads to misery for all concerned.

    Take, for example, the paradigmatic story of Abraham and Isaac.

    God orders Abraham to perform a human sacrifice, with his son Isaac as the victim. Abraham complies, but is stopped at the last moment, by God, having passed the moral test.

    The point of the story, both in itself and as it is interpreted by many in the Judeo-Christian moral tradition, is that obedience to God is the highest value, even trumping human well being.
  2. If, on the other hand, he retreats from this position to the second sense, he must prove that there are "true" moralities and "false" moralities, and that his is the only "true" one.

    If he does this, he runs the risk of simply introducing one more "true" morality, among all the others, unless he can provide some rational basis for his "is to ought" jump.

    Simply claiming that true morality is always and solely a function of the well being of conscious creatures won't cut it, no matter how inclined his audience is to agree.

So how does Sam get out of this dilemma?

Is there any hope for his position at all?

Fortunately, there is.

But in order to find it, we must first consider his motives—why he wants to defend a science of morality in the first place.

Next: Sam Harris's Motives...