Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham's five psychological foundations of morality throw a lot of light on the conservative/liberal split. But I really think there's quite a bit more to the split than just that.
One of the difficulties that grows out of any discussion involving the term "moral" stems from the conflation of the various meanings of the word. Here are two:
- To call an act "moral" can be a term of approval. It can mean that it is good, or that it is justified. Helping others, telling the truth, and not cheating can all be "moral" in this sense.
- To call an act "moral" can mean that the person who did it, did it for reasons they considered "moral". Helping others, telling the truth, not cheating, turning people over to the Nazi's, and sacrificing humans to the gods are all "moral" in this sense.
One of the difficulties I have with Haidt and Graham's paper is that they make a case for different kinds of "morality" in the second sense above, but never completely distinguish this "morality" from type #1. I actually don't think this is intentional, and I suspect that they would agree with what I am about to say, but I do think it needs to be made very clear.
They define, or describe, human morality as a cultural extension of our natural instincts for care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity. This is sense number two.
I'm quite sure the Nazi sympathizer was acting out of a moral impulse, in this sense, when he turned over people he had been taught to think of as "dirty outsiders" to "the proper authority". I'm also quite certain that the ancient priest, performing a human sacrifice, qualifies as well.
As I pointed out above, helping others and telling the truth also qualify for definition #2. Systems you or I approve of and those we don't both qualify under this definition.
But the fact that those acts are "moral" in sense #2 does not imply that they are "moral" in sense #1. It doesn't imply that they are justified, or deserve our approval. It doesn't imply the opposite, either, of course. The point is that these are two separate claims, even though they use the same term. I can grant that human sacrifice is a "moral" act under definition #2, and, at the same time, believe that it is immoral under definition #1.
It's possible to read Haidt and Graham's paper as conflating these two meanings of "moral"—of saying that the point of view of the homophobic neighbor deserves, in some sense, our respect, because it is, after all, a moral view. I think it's important to keep in mind that while Haidt and Graham demonstrate quite clearly that such a view is moral in sense #2, they don't make any case at all for it being moral in sense #1—and, therefore, make no case that the view deserves our respect, anymore than the idea of human sacrifice does.
So much for the view— the neighbor is another story. It's also possible to read the paper as arguing merely that the homophobic neighbor can be better understood if we can see things from his point of view—in spite of the fact that his view is mistaken on this point. The neighbor, as a human being, obviously deserves our respect, whether or not we can agree with his moral (#2) view.
It is also rhetorically wise to give him the respect he deserves, to try to understand why he believes what he does, and to enter our discussion with him by acknowledging his current position. As hard as it to admit, even our adversaries are rarely irrational. People usually do things for good reasons, within the structure of their worldview.
But we are still left with the question of how to determine what views or behaviors qualify as moral under definition #1. I obviously don't have a final answer for that question, but there are a couple of points I think we should consider.
The first of these is the question of what model of morality, or oughtness, we are using. I've argued before that there are primarily two of these in the human tradition: the legal model and the wisdom model. Under the legal model, "ought" is decided by moral rules. These rules are the definition of morality, and are to be followed because they have authority—often, though not always, religious authority. At its most extreme, the legal view says that the moral rules are to be followed even if the results are evil.
When I was first married, I had an argument with my wife about morality. It centered around a hypothetical example in which a woman was given the choice, in a prisoner of war camp, of sleeping with the guard or having her husband and children killed. Fundamentalist that I was at the time, it seemed to me that a woman who refused to sleep with the guard, even at the cost of her children's lives, would be doing the right thing—making a tremendous sacrifice in order to remain morally pure.
My wife had better instincts, and told me in no uncertain terms that given the choice she would save her children, and that, in spite of my unreasonable position, she would probably even make the ultimate sacrifice just to save me. We ended by agreeing not to talk about it.
My wife was following the wisdom model—at least as ancient and respectable as the legal model—which recognizes that there is always a goal or goals associated with an "ought". I ought to do A, because it will lead to B, which I value.
Just as everybody—liberals and conservatives alike—put a high value on the first two of Haidt and Graham's five foundations, everybody—liberals and conservatives alike—makes use of the wisdom model. The homophobic neighbor dislikes gay marriage because he thinks it violates God's law, but also because he thinks it will lead to a breakdown in traditional marriage.
Nor is the legal model limited to conservatives. Toward the end of the paper Haidt and Graham admonish their fellow liberals not to classify conservative views as "evil". This is necessary primarily because liberals also sometimes think in terms of the legal model, and "evil" is more at home there than in the wisdom model.
So we have two models, one of which is universal, and the other of which is used only sometimes by some people. I haven't done any research on this, but I would guess from my own experience that the people who embrace the wisdom model and the people who emphasize the first two psychological foundations (care and justice) are for the most part the same people.
This would not be an accident. If you think of morality in terms of law, you obviously put an emphasis on authority. If you don't put an emphasis on authority, you will have to judge rules of all kinds by their effects—using the wisdom model—and that will end up including rules about purity and loyalty.
Which brings me to the third distinction: the distinction between moral truth and normal truth, or, as I have called it elsewhere, Truth with a capital T, as opposed to ordinary, garden variety, run-of-the-mill truth.
I'm a fan of the second kind, but there was a time in my life that I believed wholeheartedly in the First. When the homophobic neighbor says "Homosexuality is an abomination to God," he is invoking Truth. Truth can't be proved wrong—at least not by talking about the subject matter. It is possible to convince an adherent that it is wrong by an appeal to authority, but if you succeed, it's usually because that person is already transitioning to the wisdom model, whether they know it or not.
Truth (capittal "T") is rooted in authority, not reason. Reason can be used as an apologetic for Truth, but True believers don't question Truth simply because it doesn't fit the facts (small "f"). This faith in Truth is not limited to conservatives, either, but it is common among them. A version of truth rooted in authority finds a natural home there, just as the legal model did.
The alternative is truth (small t) which simply means consulting those little, run-of-the-mill facts which the world provides. Believers in Truth will often ignore those facts, or refuse to believe them if they contradict Truth. Hence the fight over evolution, for one example.
I would suggest that while our homophobic neighbor may be a "good dude", and while his point of view may be "moral" in sense #2, several facts make it necessary to question whether his view can be considered "moral" in sense #1.
- His view overrides the justice and harm foundations, which are universally acknowledged.
- His view is based in the legal model, which eliminates the connection between ought, reason, and reality, rather than the more universal wisdom model.
- His view relies upon Truth, while dismissing or ignoring troublesome truths.
It seems to me that if we are to call a view moral (#1), then it "ought", at the very least, be rooted in truth, with a small t, with a view to probable real life consequences, and not based on two to eight lines in an ancient text (which happens to be the level of support in the Bible for the view that God disapproves of homosexuality—less evidence than there is that God disapproves of wealth, by the way). Since he changes the subject when asked to explain how gay marriage will damage society, he abdicates any claim to a wisdom model or to support from the facts.
I used the homophobic neighbor as an example because the authors provided it, but the same would be true of any view—even one I agreed with. My point is that the way in which a view is arrived at has everything to do with its status.
This is not to say that community is not an important value, or that tradition doesn't contain great truths. I am a heavy subscriber to both of those claims myself. It's one of the things that I really like about Haidt's work. The wisdom tradition, and the valuing of truth with a small "t" are both parts of the great human tradition. So is animal, and in some cases human, sacrifice, as well as cruelty toward ones enemies, and cock fights. I simply hold that there are ways, handed to us by that same tradition, to apply reason and sort out the dross.
We should use them.
